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ANNOTATING THE NEWS: MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF 
MEDIA CONVERGENCE AND CONSOLIDATION 
Eric B. Easton • 
Our goal is to have every one of our hard news programs fully convergent, 
fully interactive and flexible in both old and new media. Bob Murphy, 
ABCNews. 1 
I would prefer ABC not to cover Disney . . . . . ABC News knows that I 
would prefer them not to cover [Disney]. Michael Eisner, Chairman, 
Walt Disney Company.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Convergence and consolidation-the promise and the power. What 
a breathtaking paradox we face as we enter the twenty-first century. 
Never before has our ability to inform the public been greater. Breaking 
news from anywhere in the world appears on television screens in 
minutes. Supporting documents, first-person accounts, government 
reaction, public opinion-all follow in a torrent on personal computer 
screens. As the two screens converge, as the two streams of information 
become one, we are about to realize the promise of a nearly perfect · 
technology for journalism-a technology capable of delivering the news 
at any desired level of detail, from highly mediated to raw and bleeding. 
That is, except for one problem: we are ignored by much of our 
potential audience. Of those who do attend, many, perhaps most, 
despise us because we are "the media" existing not to serve the public 
interest, but our own. We are not Lincoln Steffens or Edward R. 
• Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. I must confess 
to writing this essay as a law professor whose concept of the First Amendment is 
informed by more than 20 years as a practicing journalist. Even though I turned in my 
press card some years ago, I have tried to bring a journalist's perspective and voice to 
this topic. The editorial "we" that creeps into my language suggests a presumption that 
other journalists are of similar mind on the issues covered here. My apologies to those 
who are not. 
I would also like to express my appreciation to Professor Richard Peltz of the 
University of Arkansas at Little Rock for inviting me to participate in this symposium 
and to the scholars, journalists and friends who made the symposium such a rewarding 
experience. Thanks to my Baltimore colleagues Professors Michael Meyerson and 
Lynn McLain, who read and critiqued this essay, as well as my research assistant Sam 
Collings and the students in my Cyberspace Law Seminar. They share fully in the 
credit for whatever may be useful about this essay; I am solely responsible for the rest. 
1. Richard Tedesco, ABC News Tests Net, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Jan. 3, 2000, 
at 87. 
2. Elizabeth Lesly Stevens, Mouse•ke-foar, BRIIL'SCONTENT, Dec. 1998/Jan. 1999, 
at 95 (quot.ing Eisner's interview on National Public Radio's Fresh Air, Sept. 29, 1998). 
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Murrow; we are not even William Randolph Hearst or Joseph Pulitzer; 
we are General Electric and Walt Disney, selling ovens, cartoons, and, 
oh yes, the news. And as we buy and sell each other, we become bigger, 
wealthier, more powerful, and, ultimately, more corrupt. In our struggle 
to cling to our audience, we eschew hard news, wallow in feel-good 
features, become boosters for local government, and betray the public. 
No wonder they hate us. 
This essay is a personal inquiry into the nature of media technol-
ogy, law, and ethics in an era marked by the convergence of media that 
have been largely separate-print, broadcast, cable, satellite, and the 
Internet-and by the consolidation of ownership in all ofthese media. 3 
What inventions, practices, and norms must emerge to enable us to take 
advantage ofthis vast new information-based world, while preserving 
such important professional values as diversity, objectivity, reliability, 
and independence~ 
Part II of this essay describes my underlying premise that the 
solution lies partly in an Internet-based system of documentation and 
annotation. I argue that the greatest threat to that vision is an unconsti-
tutionally broad reading of copyright law. Part III explores the doctrinal 
implications of the Copyright and Patent Clause and the First Amend-
ment's penumbral "right to know," both of which are crucial to reducing 
this threat. Part IV offers concrete examples to demonstrate the 
practical effect of combining these two constitutional provisions. 
Finally, Part V suggests that even this creative use of constitutional law 
will not be enough to protect our values from the exigencies of the 
modem media market. I argue that we must also take a new look at 
employment relationships and ethical principles with a view toward 
ensuring that we carry our highest ideals and aspirations into the new 
century. 
3. Nothing more clearly epitomizes this trend than the proposed acquisition of 
Time-Warner by America Online, Inc. See America Online, Inc., Press Release, AOL & 
Time Warner Will Merge to Create World's First Internet-Age Media & Communications 
Company (visited July 11, 2000) <http://media.web.aol.com/medialsearch.cfin>. 
Another example is the so-called "strategic alliance" between NBC News/MS-NBC 
and Washington Post/Newsweek. See Mike Hoyt, With 'Strategic Alliances, 'the Map Gets 
Messy, COLUM. JOURNALISM. REv., Jan./feb. 2000, at 72. 
4. See generally American Society of Newspaper Editors, Journalism Values 
Institute (visited July II, 2000) <http://www.asne.org/worksljvi/jviconte.htm>; JACK 
FULLER, NEWS VALUES: IDEAS FORAN INFORMATION AGE(1996). 
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II. INTERNET-BASED SOLUTION 
I begin with the assumption that the development of a global, 
universally accessible Internet offers the best counterweight to the 
consolidation of mainstream media in the hands of a relatively few 
multibillion-dollar, multinational corporations.5 As long as the 
infrastructure and architecture of the Internet remain free and open to 
all,6 the technology that allows each person to become a publisher will 
yield ways of enhancing the diversity of voices when a media oligopoly 
would homogenize, distort, or even silence them. 7 
Next, imagine a world, not too far in the future, where television 
news is delivered digitally through a "box" that also carries telephone 
service and Internet connections.8 As the traditional journalist offers her 
mediated version of the day's news, links to supplementary information 
and contrasting views are also appearing on the screen-some posted by 
the underlying media company, others by organizations or individuals 
that you have chosen to trust.9 
5. See, e.g., DEAN ALGER, MEGAMEDIA: HOW GIANT CORPORATIONS DOMINATE MASS 
MEDIA, DISTORT COMPETITION, AND ENDANGER DEMOCRACY (I 998); Project on Media 
Ownership, Welcome to PROMO(visited July I 1, 2000) <http://www.midwestbookseller. 
com/guest.html>. But see Paul Farhi, How Bad Is Big, AM. JOURNALISM REv., Dec. 1999, 
at 29. 
6. See, e.g., LAWRENCELESSIG,CODEAND0TIIERLAWSOFCYBERSPACE(I999). "We 
can build, or architect or code cyberspace to protect values that we believe are 
fundamental, or we can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to allow those values to 
disappear." /d. at 6. But see David Post, What Larry Doesn't Get: A Libertarian Response 
to Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (visited July 11, 2000) <http://www.temple. 
edu/lawschooll dpost/Code.html>. 
7. In some cases, antitrust law may provide structural safeguards for First 
Amendment values, although care must be taken lest this become a back door for the 
kind of government regulation that I argue should be rejected. See, e.g., Associated 
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) ("Freedom of the press from 
governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of 
that freedom by private interests."); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 5.12 U.S. 622,657 
(1994) ("The First Amendment's command that government not impede the freedom 
of speech does not disable the government from taking steps to ensure that private 
interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of communication, 
the free flow ofinformation and ideas."). Application of antitrust law to media mergers 
and acquisitions is beyond the scope of this essay. 
8. See generally Don West, 2000 Mil/enniavision, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Jan. 3, 
2000, at 38. 
9. By "trust," I do not necessarily mean "agree with," but, rather, "find reliable 
for the purpose intended." The inventorofthe World Wide Web, Tim Berners-Lee, has 
called trust the greatest prerequisite for a web-like society. "The criteria a person uses 
to assign trust can range from some belief held by their mother to a statement made by 
one company about another. The Freedom to choose one's own trust criteria is as 
important a right as any." TiM BERNERS-LEE,WEAVINGlHE WEB 126 (1999). See also 
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You watch the news interactively, pausing the digital video signal 
long enough to read some portion of the original documents, view some 
hostile commentary, and make up your own mind. The viewer, not the 
media empire, controls the message. 
Documentation and annotation are essential tools for ensuring a 
diversity of voices and other values that are fundamental to this vision 
of the new media environment. Documentation, support for the 
mediated news story posted by the original provider, not only offers 
additional information but, in ore importantly, reinforces the consumer's 
confidence in the validity of the journalist's work product. Many 
mainstream news broadcasts and newspaper articles already carry the 
message that additional information is available through the broad-
caster's or publisher's web site. The quotation that begins this essay 
refers to an ABC experiment in precisely this kind of documentation, 
ultimately in an interactive television environment. 10 Documentation 
may be a technological challenge, but presents no particular legal 
problem. 
Annotation, on the other hand, includes supporting or contradictory 
references, endorsement or criticism, posted by a competing news 
service, an interested individual or organization, or information 
consumers themselves. Long a staple ofUsenet newsgroups, annotation 
is perhaps the defining feature of the Internet as a medium for mass 
communication. 11 Already, people jump onto the Internet when a major 
news story is breaking, surfing the web on their personal computers 
while CNN is blaring from the television set. 12 An interactive media 
web site might well include online links, discussion boards, or chat 
rooms that can provide at least the illusion of annotation. 13 
Like documentation, annotation is a mechanism for disseminating 
information and testing its reliability. But it is a far more powerful tool 
when, and then precisely because, it comes from diverse sources, 
beyond the control of"the media." Indeed, critical annotation might be 
ESTHER DYSON, RELEASE 2.0 251-53 ( 1997). 
10. Se~ Tedesco, supra note 1. See also Rachel Alexander, Take Me Out to the Web 
Site, WASH. POST, May 14,2000, at AI (describing Internet-enhanced television sports 
coverage). 
11. See generally ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET 127-154 ( 1992). 
12. For example, one can get a Serb perspective on events in Kosovo from Media 
and Publishing Center of Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Raska and Prizen, Kosovo.com 
(visited July 11, 2000) <http://www .kosovo.com> or an Albanian perspective from Alb-
Net Group, Kosova Crisis Center (visited July 11, 2000) <http://www.alb-net. 
cornlindex.htm>. 
13. See, e.g., Tedesco, supra note 1. 
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just the antidote to the gossip, sensationalism, and inaccuracies that 
audiences complain about so often today. More than self-selected 
documentation, trusted annotation can instill confidence when the story 
is right or correct the record in real time. 
Annotation could take any number of different forms. I have 
already mentioned the online links, discussion boards, or chat rooms 
supplied by the underlying information provider and the simultaneous 
annotation that occurs when people surf the web to verify or amplify 
breaking news they see on television or read in the newspapers. 
Another model for the convergent media environment is exemplified by 
a growing family of Internet-based software tools variously described 
as "distributed portals"14 or "browser assistants."15 Among the new 
products are uTOK, 16 Kenjin, 17 flyswat18 and ThirdVoice. 19 ThirdVoice 
was one of the earliest of these tools, and has already undergone one 
complete makeover. 
Originally, ThirdVoice called itself a "free browser companion that 
allows you to post notes that fuse your own ideas with Web con-
tent-adding perspective and stimulating discussion. "20 Once a user 
downloaded ThirdV oice software, she could post a note to any page on 
the web. This note, or annotation, could be made visible to all or ~ 
select group ofThirdVoice users. Such postings did not physically alter 
the target web site, at least not as stored in its host server, and they 
remained invisible to the visitor who was not equipped with ThirdVoice 
software. 
Modest experimentation with ThirdVoice revealed somewhat 
finicky software and relatively few annotations; revenue opportunities 
were not obvious. Today, the software is less finicky, the number of 
annotations is practically limitless, and revenue opportunities abound.21 
14. Bob Metcalfe, Bob Metcalfe's Report from DEMO, INFOWORLD.COM (visited July 
11, 2000) <http://www.infoworld.com/articles/op/xml/00/02/09/000209 
opmetcalfeflash.xml>. 
15. Jennifer Tanaka, The Web's Best Friends, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 13, 2000, at 70-72. 
16. See uTOK, Inc., Welcome to uTOK! (visited July 11, 2000) <http:// 
www.uTOK.com>. 
17. See Autonomy Systems Limited, Inc., Kenjin (visited July 11, 2000) <http:// 
www .kenjin.com!kenjin.html>. 
18. See Flyswat, Inc., Flyswat-Answers on the Fly (visited July 11, 2000) <http:// 
www.flyswat.com/>. 
19. See ThirdVoice, Inc., ThirdVoice (visited July 11, 2000) <http:// 
www.thirdvoice.com/>. 
20. From a previous version of<http://www.thirdvoice.com>, no longer available. 
21. ThirdVoice's "partners" include, among others, U.S. News and World Report and 
investment advisers Motley Fool. See ThirdVoice, Inc., Leading Internet and Media 
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Now, when Third Voice users surf the web with the software turned on, 
they will see their favorite web pages annotated with bright orange lines 
underscoring key words. Clicking on one of those underscored 
words-typically companies, places, celebrities, etc.-will shrink the 
underlying web page and launch a smaller window to the right of the 
first. That window contains a variety of predetermined finks that lead 
to more information about the key word. It may also contain messages 
posted by other Third Voice users who have visited the underlying page. 
Users are encouraged to create their own "active words," instantly 
annotated with a built-in search engine and, if desired, the user's own 
commentary. 
Once perfected and popularized by ThirdVoice or some other 
company, the technology could be built into every browser and 
transform the way the web is used.22 One can easily imagine a version 
ofthis kind oftechnology being used to challenge the accuracy of news 
stories, the integrity of political campaign advertising, or the quality of 
entertainment programming. One can imagine postings that link to 
supporting or supplementary data, in real time or after careful delibera-
tion, by experts, stakeholders, or ordinary people. One can imagine an 
entire industry dedicated to facilitating these annotations. 
And one can easily imagine a copyright infringement lawsuit. Even 
though the underlying web page is not altered, the annotated web page, 
as it appears on the user's computer screen, could arguably be consid-
ered an infringing derivative work.23 The annotations have no meaning-
ful existence absent the underlying web page, whose owner has no 
control over the appearance of those orange hyperlinks on the visitor's 
computer screen, nor over the information and opinion they invoke. 
Companies Partner with ThirdVoice to Extend Brands and Connect with Consumers Online 
(visited July II, 2000) <http://www.thirdvoice.com/about/030IOO_release.htm>. 
22. See Michael J. Miller, Whatever Happened to Just Plain Browsing?, PC MAGAZINE 
(visited July II. 2000) <http://www.zdnet.com/pcmag/stories/opinions/ 
0, 7802,244 7598,00.html>. 
23. This hypothetical was posed in Stacey L. Dogan, Copyright in Cyberspace: 
Exclusive Rights and Infringement, in LEARNING CYBERLAW IN CYBERSPACE (Lydia Pallas 
Loren ed .• 1999), available at <http://www.cyberspacelaw.org>. 
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, 
such as a translation, ... abridgment, condensation, or any other form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of 
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, 
as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work." 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 1998). "Subject to certain limitations, the owner of the 
copyright in underlying work has the exclusive right to prepare or authorize the 
·preparation of derivative works based on the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § I 06(2) 
(1994 & Supp. 1998). 
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ThirdVoice has not yet been legally challenged, but some Web masters 
have already expressed irritation with the software in postings linked to 
the ThirdVoice home page.24 Under conventional copyright analysis, a 
24. A conversation that appeared on the ThirdVoice site under the heading "Great 
software, but ... ," but is no longer available, demonstrated this point: 
Initial Posting: "I love the innovation behind this software, and think it's 
great that feedback can come so easily. However, without a governing 
procedure for this software, it can become quite annoying to the 
webmaster. Perhaps if the client side application would only show 
notes ifthe web site didn't have something banning them?" 
Derek: "That would be GREAT! I do like the idea of these notes, and if 
webmasters had at least some control over what shows up at their 
page, these notes cold be embraced by the who[le] internet 
community!" 
Joshua: "Webmasters do not have the right to delete those notes. If 
Webmasters were able to do it, well, I can predict that more than 90% 
ofthe notes on the webpage will be deleted. Furthermore, ThirdVoice 
merely adds another level ofwebpage that allows us as consumers or 
human beings who are born with the right to freedom of speech to 
express our optmons. If I am not mistaken, you must be the 
webmasters of many webpages, right? Question: Can anyone tell me 
to shut up? Your answer will be 'can' if you agree that webmasters 
should have the right to delete our notes." 
Derek: "I don't want to be able to delete notes (unless they are blatant 
flames ... ). Never happened on my message boards, but I wouldn't 
be surprised if some flamer decided it'd be cool to go talk trash about 
every site he could. That wasn't what I was meaning, anyway. I was 
talking about having control over having the notes appear on your 
pages at all. Maybe just a snippet of javascript that would not let 
ThirdVoice post notes on the site. That is not taking away your 
freedom of speech, because the content ofthe page is MINE. I own 
it, in a way, when people post notes on my page, they are taking away 
my freedom of speech, or press-whichever one it is for the web. 
Anyway, since I doubt ThirdVoice will ever do anything, this is kind 
ofpointless .... " 
Argentum: "Actually, since the notes aren't on your page, you have no 
control over them, either legally, or otherwise. They are kept on 
ThirdVoice's server, I'd assume, so you have no choice as to what is 
put on that server. (It doesn't belong to you.)" 
Joshua: "The court will decide whether ThirdVoice has trespassed 
webmasters' territory. What I mean is that, whenever we as 
ThirdVoice users want to read the notes posted by other ThirdVoice 
users, we have to retrieve them from the server of thirdvoice.com. 
Have we or other ThirdVoice users really posted notes or trespassed 
the territory ofwebmasters? It seems to me that we just write some 
notes and paste it on a wall that does not belong to the webmasters. 
Take for example, ifl am against any policy of the government and 
decide to take to the street, I put my opinions on a placard. Does this 
placard belong to the one I am protesting against? One day, courts 
will decide on that." 
Derek: "But if you make the notes show on the page, you are then editing 
150 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23 
hypothetical Third Voice infringement case would be a close 
call. 25 · 
I argue that it should not be a close call at all, that the 
Copyright and Patent Clause, coupled with the First Amendment 
right to know, requires the courts to read more narrowly the 
economic rights of the owner of a web site that has been anno-
tated,26 or to read more expansively the fair use rights of the 
annotators, the visitors, and those who make annotation 
my page. There are a bunch of red squares [the first version of 
ThirdVoice used red 'twisties' to link to comments] on my site. I 
don't want that, would you? I'm not arguing against the notes being 
next to the page, in the left side of you browser window. What I'm 
against is when the red squares are added to the page. There are 
design elements that could be really messed with! I like the idea of 
this community of people who can make a comment about sites. I use 
message boards for that reason! I just don't want my page to look any 
different than the way I designed it." 
Joshua: "You won't discover the difference if you are not using ThirdVoice. 
Disable or uninstall ThirdVoice if you think that the notes posted by 
ThirdVoice users are really annoying to your eyes. Likewise, if other 
users of ThirdVoice find the note markers are annoying, they will 
disable or uninstall ThirdVoice too. So, do you have any better 
suggestions to tell TV users that other TV users have posted their 
notes on a webpage? Shall we replace the note markers with 
American flags?" 
Derek: "I'm done with this conversation. I don't have time to argue about 
this." 
Original HTML on file with author. 
25. See Twin Peaks Prod. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(holding that a "guide" to the television series Twin Peaks, which summarized the 
original teleplays and added commentary, a trivia quiz, and biographical and other 
information, was an infringing derivative work). There are no definitive holdings that 
address web pages, but the computer-based video game industry has provided two 
Ninth Circuit opinions that demonstrate just how uncertain this law can be. Compare 
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that a device that could alter some of the features of a Nintendo game without 
permanently altering the computer code in the game cartridge was not a derivative 
work and did not violate the copyright held by Nintendo) with Micro Star v. FormGen, 
Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that software that could alter some of the 
features of a FormGen game without permanently altering the original code was a 
derivative work that likely infringed FormGen's copyright). This article does not 
attempt to determine whether ThirdVoice infringes or, more likely, contributes to the 
infringement of underlying web sites when users visit the site with the software "turned 
on." See infra note 84. It is enough to suggest that some courts may so hold. 
26. In addition to the right to create a derivative work, the Copyright Act provides 
copyright owners with exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, publicly perfonn and 
display the works in which they own the copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994 & Supp. 
1998). 
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possible.27 This kind of technology is vital to restoring the 
balance between public access to information and the private 
interests of information providers in an era of convergence and 
consolidation. First, though, I explore the evidence for the 
proposition that Congress does not have the authority to grant 
copyrights that constrict, rather than expand, the free flow of 
information, and that courts have the obligation to enforce that 
principle. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COPYRIGHT AND PATENT CLAUSE AND 
THE "RIGHT TO KNOW" 
The search for a doctrinal justification for the above assertion 
logically begins with the Constitution itself, particularly its 
Copyright and Patent Clause: "Congress shall have the power to 
promote the progress of science28 and useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to use 
their respective writings and discoveries. " 29 At first blush, the 
elucidation of purpose in this clause should provide a solid basis· 
for this argument. According to Professor Pollack, however, 
neither the text, nor its history, nor the interpretive case law 
compels such an outcome.3° Coupled with the First Amendment, 
and especially its penumbral right to know, however, this clause 
may require the government to tailor its grant of copyright 
protection to promote the free flow of information and to with-
hold such protection when the flow of information would be 
unduly restricted. 31 
27. Fair use is a limitation on the exclusive rights of copyright owners. "(T]he fair 
use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching ... , scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U .S.C. 
§ 107 (1994). The act contains a nonexclusive list of factors to be considered in 
determining whether a use is fair, including the purpose and character of the use, the 
nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used, and 
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the original copyrighted 
work. See id. See also discussion infra Part III. 
28. By "science," the framers doubtless had in mind the Latin "scientia," or 
knowledge. See William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting 
the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 907, 910 n.18 (1997). 
29. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. 
30. See Malia Pollack. The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the 
Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 
17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 65-66 (1999). 
31. See id. at 72. Professor Pollack's article specifically concerns legislation 
introduced under Congress's Commerce Clause authority, but there is no reason why 
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A. Copyright and Patent Clause 
There is, indeed, precious little evidence that the Copyright 
and Patent Clause itself goes beyond a mere statement of pol icy 
to serve as an enforceable limitation on Congress's power to grant 
copyrights. 32 The textual argument for imposing such a limitation 
would point to the first clause, "[t]o promote the [p]rogress of 
[s]cience and the useful [a]rts,"33 as the singular enumerated 
power given to Congress. This would comport with the structure 
ofthe rest of Article I, section 8, which empowers Congress "[t]o 
lay and collect taxes,"34 "[t]o borrow money,"35 "[t]o regulate 
commerce,"36 and so on. The rest of the clause, "by securing for 
limited times ... ,"37 i.e., by enacting copyright and patent laws, 
merely describes how this should be accomplished. Therefore, 
the argument might go, promotion of knowledge is the only 
legitimate purpose of copyright law, and any interpretation of 
copyright law that, on balance, diminishes the store of public 
knowledge must be invalid. 
When one looks at the meager history of the clause, however, 
one finds that the first version of this clause proposed to the 
Constitutional Convention read, "To secure to literary authors 
their copy rights for a limited time. " 38 The language was changed 
on the recommendation of the Committee of Eleven without 
further debate. 39 One could argue that the final version repre-
the essence of her analysis would not apply equally to legislation introduced directly 
under the authority of the Copyright and Patent Clause. She writes: 
/d. 
I posit a right to know in the form of a duty by the government not to block 
access to information. Congress does not have the power to use the 
Commerce Clause to create a right to exclude others from information (i.e., 
a quasi-property right) if that right (i) deters the progress of science and the 
useful arts, (ii) limits the freedom of the press, (iii) limits the right to petition 
the government, or (iv) limits the freedom of discussion through speech. The 
mutually reinforcing Intellectual Property Clause and First Amendment may 
not be bypassed merely by stating that a statute is enacted pursuant to the 
CGmmerce Clause. 
32. For a more complete discussion, see Patry, supra note 28, at 910-14. 
33. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. 
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I. 
35. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 2. 
36. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3. 
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
38. See JAMES MADISON, RECORDS OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787 at 563 (Charles C. Tansill ed., 1989). 
39. See id. at 666-67. 
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sented a rethinking of that mandate, or merely cosmetics bor-
rowed from the Statute of Anne.40 Neither the Statute of Anne nor 
the United States Constitution, however, enshrines "the encour-
agement of learning" or the "promotion of the progress of 
science" as the sole justification for awarding copyrights. The 
language of reward is everywhere as prominent as the language of 
incentive,41 and Madison himself saw these private and public 
interests as coincident. 42 
Of course, Madison was selling a product. Lord Macaulay 
would later view these interests, not as coincident, but as existing 
in rough equilibrium. Copyright was the least objectionable way 
to remunerate authors, certainly as compared to patronage, in 
order to ensure a supply of good books. "For the sake of the good 
we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to last a day 
longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good. " 43 
The American case of Wheaton v. Peters,44 decided a few years 
before Macaulay's speech, seems also to emphasize the public 
40. See Act 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710) (Eng.). Unquestionably the precursor of 
American copyright law, the statute was subtitled, "An Act for the encouragement of 
learning, by vesting copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of such copies, 
during the times therein mentioned." See J .A.L. STERLING, WoRWCOPYRIGHT LAW 9-1 0 
(1998). 
41. Indeed, the preamble to the Statute of Anne reverses the emphasis of its 
subtitle: 
Whereas printers, booksellers, and other persons have of late frequently 
taken the liberty of printing, reprinting, and publishing ... books and other 
writings, without the consent of the authors or proprietors of such books and 
writings, to their very great detriment, and too often to the ruin of them and 
their families; for preventing therefore such practices for the future, and for 
the encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful books; may 
it ... be enacted .... 
/d. at 996. Justice Story was of similar mind as he lamented the impoverishment of 
authors while the "world has derived immense wealth from their labors": 
It is, indeed, but a poor reward, to secure to authors and inventors, for a 
limited period only, an exclusive title to that, which is, in the noblest sense, 
their own property; and to require it ever afterwards to be dedicated to the 
public. But, such as the provision is, it is impossible to doubt its justice, or 
its policy, so far as it aims at their protection and encouragement. 
JOSEPH STORY, A FAMD..IAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 118 
(1840). 
42. "The utility of this [copyright and patent] power will scarcely be questioned 
. . . . The public good fully coincides ... with the claims of individuals." THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 271 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961 ). 
43. Lord Macaulay, Speech Delivered in the House of Commons, 3 Feb. 1841, in PROSE 
AND POETRY 731,733-37 (G. Young ed., 1967). 
44. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). 
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over the private interest by confining the plaintiff's rights to the 
terms ofthe federal copyright statute.4~ 
Later cases support that reading. "The sole interest of the 
United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly 
lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of 
authors," Chief Justice Hughes wrote in 1931.46 "The copyright 
law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a 
secondary consideration," wrote Justice Douglas in 194 7.47 "The 
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to 
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement 
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance 
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 
'Science and useful Arts. "'48 
But even ifthe foregoing establishes the priority of the public 
interest in incentive over the private interest in reward, it does not 
bring us to a self-executing Constitutional mandate. Professor 
Jaszi suggests that 
legislative and judicial attempts to apply this rhetorically 
satisfying formula to actual cases immediately confront 
questions that defy empirical analysis: How much of a reward 
is appropriate in exchange for a given amount of public 
availability? How long should a copyright endure? And how 
intense should copyright protection be if it is to provide 
adequate incentive without producing unnecessary restrictions 
on access?49 
Nowhere is the inadequacy of the Copyright and Patent 
Clause as a guide to policy making more apparent than in Justice 
O'Connor's oft-quoted assertion that the "Framers intended 
copyright itself to be an engine of free expression. " 50 While this 
statement might seem merely a continuation ofthe rhetoric cited 
above, it is instead the predicate for what amounts to an assertion 
that statutory construction and not constitutional analysis, that 
Congress and not the Supreme Court, will determine the scope of 
45. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 257 (1985). 
46. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1931). 
47. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1947) .. 
48. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,219 (1954). 
49. Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship", 
1991 0UKEL.J.455,464. 
50. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
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any limitation the Clause imposes. 51 In the end, we are left with 
Professor Pollack's insight that the constitutional mandate for 
reconsidering copyright protections in the digital era lies in the 
nexus of the Copyright and Patent Clause and the First Amend-
ment's "right to know."'2 
B. The First Amendment Right to Know 
Unfortunately, the right to know is itself problematic. Some 
of the nation's finest First Amendment scholars have found in the 
right to know an invitation to direct governmental regulation to 
preserve the diversity of voices and other values threatened by 
consolidation in the media market. 53 The touchstone for these 
scholars54 is the 1969 case of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. -FCC. 55 
In that case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
FCC's fairness doctrine, specifically its requirement that broad-
casters provide free air time for reply to anyone who was person-
ally attacked during the discussion of a public controversy. 56 
Justice White's emphasis in Red Lion on the "paramount" right of 
the viewers and listeners became the mantra of those advocating 
government intervention in the arena of free speech. 57 
51. Justice O'Connor continues: 
In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the 
Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and 
uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and 
comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for 
expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure 
exception to copyright. 
/d. at 560. 
52. See generally Pollack, supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
53. See, e.g., OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); LEE C. BOLLINGER, 
IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS ( 1991 ); Cass Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, l 04 
YALE L.J. 1757 (I 995). See also J.M. Balkin, Frontiers of Legal Thought II: The New First 
Amendment: Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First 
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 395; JAY JENSEN, LmERALISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE 
MASS MEDIA ( 1959). 
54. They are variously referred to as legal realists, neoliberals, post-modernists, 
and civic republicans. 
55. 395 u.s. 367 (1969). 
56. See id. at 390. 
57. /d. 
Because ofthe scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to 
put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be 
expressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their 
interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium 
function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It 
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Because this paramount right to know belongs not only to 
individuals, but to the public at large, it can (or, perhaps, must) 
be vindicated by government intervention when private interests 
threaten to stifle the free flow of information. And that, or so the 
theory goes, is precisely what is happening today. Through 
mergers and acquisitions, private media companies have so 
consolidated their hold on the mainstream media that they have 
effectively frozen out dissenting or unorthodox voices and 
compromised editorial integrity in the quest for the almighty 
dollar. 
Journalists feel the impact of consolidation even earlier than 
the general public. When we see such phenomena as 60 Minutes' 
spiking an important story at the behest of merger-minded 
corporate lawyers, 58 or the Los Angeles Times' splitting ad revenues 
with the subject of a major feature story-without informing its 
reporters59-we all die a little inside. At the local level, the used 
car scam expose that never got printed has become a cliche, and 
the evening "news" story that promotes network e·ntertainment 
programming is now de rigueur. We don't need to be told that 
convergence and consolidation jeopardizes our most deeply held 
values. 
Even in the new mecpa arena, we are beginning to see the 
impact of convergence and consolidation. Last year, AOL 
championed a Portland, Oregon, ordinance requiring AT&T 
(which had previously acquired cable giant TCI) to open its cable-
based platform for broad-band Internet access to all Internet 
service providers.60 This year, AOL-having become a prospec-
is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, 
which is paramount. It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an 
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather 
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the 
· Government itself or a private licensee. It is the right of the public to receive 
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and 
experiences which is crucial here. That right may not be constitutionally 
abridged either by Congress or by the FCC. 
/d. (internal citations omitted). 
58. See. e.g.,JonathanAiter, Blowing Smoke at CBS, NEWSWEEK, Dec.4, 1995, at45; 
Howard Kurtz, Details ofUnaired Tobacco Story Emerge, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1995, at 
A3. 
59. See. e.g., William Prochnau, Down and Out in L.A., AM. JOURNALISM REV., 
Jan./Feb. 2000, at 58. 
60. See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae The openNET Coalition, AT&T Corp. v. 
City of Portland (9th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-35609). 
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tive cable giant itself through the acquisition of Time-
Warner-called off its lobbyists in Maryland and Virginia, where 
open-access legislation had been introduced.61 Even when the two 
firms announced a "memorandum of understanding" pledging to 
allow open access,62 legislators conducting hearings on the merger 
expressed serious misgivings. 63 
Yet we know instinctively that government intervention is not 
the solution. Our blood boils when we learn that the government 
has bribed our corporate bosses to insert anti-drug messages into 
entertainment scripts and thus "buy down" low-cost public 
interest advertising commitments-commitments that would not 
have been made in the first place but for vestigial government 
regulation of broadcasting.64 "Could the government pay the 
networks to slip idle comments into ER about the virtues of a 
particular health care policy?"65 First ER, then 20120, then the 
Evening News? 
That instinct tends to make us more comfortable with another 
group of scholars who sees government regulation as antithetical 
to the essential autonomy of the press.66 These scholars find 
61. See PeterS. Goodman and Craig Timberg, AOL Ends Its Push for Open Access, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2000, at A 1. 
62. See America Online, Inc., AOL & Time Warner Announce Framework for 
Agreements to Offer AOL Service & Other ISPs on Time Warner Broadband Cable Systems 
(visited July 12, 2000) <http://media.web.aol.com>. 
63. See Ariana Eunjung Cha & Peter S. Goodman, AOL, Time Warner Try to Allay 
Fears, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2000, atE 1. "'The most significant danger to the promise 
ofthe Internet is the possibility that a single company or a handful of companies control 
who can access or develop applications and content,' said committee Chairman Orrin 
G. Hatch (R-Utah)." /d. Those misgivings were only intensified recently when Time-
Warner, in a contract dispute with Disney, briefly refused to carry ABC broadcast 
signals on several of its cable outlets. See Steve McClellan & John M Higgins, Disney 
Triumphant, BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 8, 2000, at 8. 
64. See Daniel Forbes, Prime Time Propaganda SALON (visited July 12, 2000) 
<http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2000/0 1/13/drugs/index.html>. See also Charles 
Krauthammer, A Network Sellout . .. , WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2000, at A29. 
65. See House Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer 
Protection, The White House, the Networks and TV Programming, Oversight Hearing, 
Prepared Statement of Robert Corn-Revere (visited July 12, 2000) <http:// 
com-notes.house.gov>. 
66. See, e.g., LUCASA.POWE,JR.,THEFOURTHESTATEANDTIIECONSTITUTION(l991); 
C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LmERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH ( 1989). See also Thomas G. 
Krattenmaker & Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Principles for 
Converging Communications Media, 104 Y ALEL.J. 1719 (1995); Steven G. Gey, The Case 
Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 193 (1996); Steven Helle, 
Essay on the Bill of Rights: Whither the Public's Right (Not) to Know? Milton, Malls, and 
Multicultural Speech, 1991 U. ILL L. REv. 1077. 
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support in the Supreme Court's rapid retreat from Red Lion, a 
retreat that culminated in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo. 61 
In that case, the Supreme Court struck down a Florida statute 
requiring newspapers to provide a right of reply that was constitu-
tionally indistinguishable from the fairness doctrine upheld in Red 
Lion, except that the context was newspapers, rather than televi-
sion. Because these scholars accept the premise that a right to 
know necessarily invites government regulation, however, they 
tend to reject or severely limit the concept. 68 
My own survey of the cases suggests that the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly recognized the existence ofthe right to know, even 
while leaving its scope and limits fuzzy. Any number of cases 
recognize at least the limited right to prevent gover:nment 
interference with a willing speaker's liberty,69 but only Red Lion 
67. 418 u.s. 241 (1974). 
68. See, e.g., POWE, supra note 66, at 257 ("The right to know is not a right; it's a 
slogan. Furthermore, it is a dangerous slogan, because it instantly invites inquiry into 
the actual performance of a newspaper. Instead of giving the press more rights, it runs 
the risk of denying the press its most sacred possession, its autonomy."); BAKER, supra 
note 66, at 67. 
69. See, e.g., First Nat. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.31 (1978) (striking 
down a state law limiting corporate contributions to referendum campaigns, asserting 
that the "First Amendment rejects the 'highly paternalistic' approach of statutes ... 
which restrict what the people may hear"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 48-49 (1976) 
(striking down limits on campaign spending on the ground that "the concept that 
government may restrictthe speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance 
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment"); Procunier v. 
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 ( 1974) (per curiam)(striking down regulations governing 
the censorship of prisoner correspondence, holding that both sender and recipient derive 
"a protection against unjustified governmental interference with the intended 
communication" from the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (striking down a 
Georgia law that imposed criminal penalties for mere possession of obscene materials); 
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946) (reversing the conviction of a 
Jehovah's Witness for distributing literature on the sidewalks of a company-owned 
town, on the ground that the first and fourteenth Amendments prohibit censorship of 
the information the residents of the town need to be properly informed, good citizens); 
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) (reversing the conviction of a union 
organizer for speaking to a group of workers without the required state license, on 
grounds that the license requirement imposed an unconstitutional "restriction upon 
Thomas's right to speak and the rights of the workers to hear what he had to say."); 
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (upholding the right of individual 
householders to receive advertisements distributed door to door); Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters of Holy Names, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that the liberty interest protects 
the right of parents to educate their children in private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that the right to receive information, including foreign 
language training, is a protected "liberty interest" under the Due Process Clause). But 
see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (rejecting a "right to know" argument to 
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and other broadcasting cases70 hold that this right to know invites 
government intervention to suppress the right of some to speak in 
order that other voices may be heard. 71 
Significantly, three important cases find a right to know that 
is independent of anyone's right to speak. In Lamont v. Postmaster 
General, 72 the Supreme Court appeared to vindicate a First 
Amendment right to receive information without regard to the 
rights of the speaker-unless one stretches the First Amendment 
right to speak to the government of the People's Republic of 
China. Nor were speakers' rights considered in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 73 although 
willing First Amendment speakers were obviously waiting in the 
wings. 74 Finally, in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 75 the court 
found a right to receive information despite unwilling private and 
government speakers.76 Thus, the notion that a First Amendment 
right to know exists independently of the right to speak is 
supported by more than obiter dicta. 
That is important because, if there is no independent right to 
know, then the right to know is limited in its effect to preventing 
government interference with a willing speaker.77 But ifthe right 
challenge restrictions on travel to Cuba). 
70. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (l973)(holding that the 
First Amendment did not compel broadcasters to take paid editorial advertising, but 
apparently leaving open the possibility that the First Amendment would not prevent the . 
FCC from imposing such a requirement in the public interest). 
71. In fact, several cases explicitly contradict this proposition. See Board of Ed. 
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (rejecting a school district's unfettered discretion to 
remove books from school libraries, citing the "right to receive ideas [as] a necessary 
predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press and 
political freedom"); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. I, 
9-l 0 (I 986) (vacating a Commission order requiring a utility company to disseminate 
the literature of a ratepayers' organization, relying in part on Tornillo's proscription 
against curtailing one speaker's right to speak in favor of another's). 
72. 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (striking down a federal statute requiring a request in 
writing as a prerequisite to the delivery of unsealed mail from abroad containing 
Communist propaganda material). 
73. 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (striking down Virginia's ban on advertising the prices 
of prescription drugs). · 
74. See id. at 756 n.l4. The putative "willing speakers" were the national or 
regional discount drugstores that wanted to advertise prescription drug prices in 
Virginia. /d. 
75. 448 U.S. 555 (1980)(affirmingthe rightofthe publictoattendcriminal trials). 
76. See id. at 559. Originally, the defendant flied the motion to exclude the public 
from the courtroom, the prosecution did not oppose it, and the judge approved it. See 
id. 
77. See Baker, supra note 66, at 67-69. 
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to know is enforceable without reference to any speaker, then it 
can provide a powerful tool for protecting the public interest in 
the free flow of information by preventing the government from 
granting intellectual property rights that would have the opposite 
effect. 
This proposition flows from the work of a new generation of 
scholars who were ·prompted to take a hard look at the relation-
ship between the First Amendment and intellectual property rights 
by the legislative over-reaching of corporate copyright owners 
eager to protect their economic interests in the digital environ-
ment.78 The targets of these scholars include the proposed 
Uniform Commercial Code Article 28, now circulating among 
state legislatures as the Uniform Computer Information Transac-
tions Act ("UCITA"); 79 the Digital Millennium Copyright Act; 80 
and the proposed Collections of Information Antipiracy Act 
("CIAA "). 81 In each case, traditional First Amendment "safety 
78. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment 
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Pamela 
Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital &onomy: Why the Anti-Circumvention 
Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 ( 1999); Pollack, supra note 
30. 
79. See National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Uniform 
Computer Information Transaction Act (visited July 12, 2000) 
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/b1Vu1c/ucita/cita10st.htm>. See also Carol A. Kunze, 
UCITA Online (visited July 12, 2000) <http://www.ucitaonline.com>. 
80. 17 U.S.C. § 1201-1205 (Supp. 1998) (prohibiting the circumvention of 
technological measures designed to prevent access to or infringement of copyrighted. 
material or tampering with copyright management information). 
81. In 1998, the House of Representatives passed the CIAA, which was then 
introduced, but died, in the Senate. There are presently two legislative proposals for 
database protection in the 1 06th Congress: H.R. 354, Collections of Information 
Antipiracy Act, sponsored by Rep. Howard Coble (R-N.C.); and H.R. 1858, the 
Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act, sponsored by Rep. Tom Bliley (R-
Va.). Both were awaiting floor action at this writing. See Thomas, Legislative 
Information on the Internet, H.R. 354 (visited July 12, 2000) <http://rs9.1oc.gov>; 
Thomas, Legislative Information on the Internet, H.R .. /858 (visited July 12, 2000) 
<http://rs9.loc.gov>. 
2000] ANNOTATING THE NEWS 161 
valves"-including the first sale doctrine82 and fair use83-have 
been weakened or eliminated by copyright owners who recognize 
and fear the power of the Internet to facilitate copying and 
distribution of protected information products. 
Because the first sale doctrine and fair use are mechanisms 
for preserving the public interest in works of authorship against 
the private interests of the copyright owners, their diminishment 
implicates both the Copyright Clause's grant of authority for 
Congress to "promote the progress of science" and the First 
Amendment right to know. These constitutional provisions, taken 
together, require that the courts narrowly construe the Copyright 
Clause's grant of authority and subject any expansion of that 
authority to heightened scrutiny. Any grant of copyright author-
ity that constricts the free flow of information to the public must 
be struck down unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
ling governmental interest. Alternatively, judicial remedies may 
be fashioned to protect the public's interest while avoiding direct 
constitutional adjudication. Such remedies might include an 
expansive reading of the fair use defense, or a narrow reading of 
such affirmative rights as the right to copy, distribute, or make 
derivative works. In Part IV, we will consider what this means 
for preserving First Amendment values when they are most 
seriously threatened by protected First Amendment actors: the 
media owners themselves. 
IV. CONCRETE EXAMPLES 
To see how this principle might work in practice, consider the 
pending case of Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse 
Ministry. 84 In that case, the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah has granted a preliminary injunction barring the 
82. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994). "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 
106(3),.the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, 
or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the 
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or 
phonorecord." /d. The "first sale doctrine" enables the purchaser of a newspaper, for 
example, to give it to a friend, place it in a library, or post clippings on a bulletin board. 
See id. An online distributor of that same newspaper could deprive the purchaser of any 
such right by selling read-only access-and potentially inhibit the dissemination of 
information. 
83. See 17U.S.C. § 107(1994). Seea/sosupranote27. 
84. 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999). 
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defendant from linking to web sites that contained allegedly 
infringing copies of a religious book published by the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 8~ The plaintiff owns the 
copyright in the book, while the defendant operates a minis-
try-and web site-dedicated to "document[ing] problems with 
the claims of Mormonism and compar[ing] LOS doctrines with 
Christianity. " 86 
The court held that plaintiff was likely to establish at trial 
that certain unidentified defendants, unaffiliated with the Utah 
Lighthouse Ministry ("ULM"), directly infringed plaintiff's 
copyright by posting portions of the Church Handbook of Instruc-
tions on three web sites.87 Finding that the plaintiff had not shown 
that ULM contributed to that infringement, 88 the court neverthe-
less held that-by linking to the infringing sites and encouraging 
visitors to use those links-ULM might we11 be liable for 
contributing to infringement by any third parties who might 
browse the infringing web sites. 89 
The court gave short shrift to defendants' arguments that their 
First Amendment rights would be infringed by a preliminary 
injunction. "The First Amendment does not give defendants the 
right to infringe on legally recognized rights under the copyright 
law,"90 the court said. "The court, in fashioning the scope of 
injunctive relief, is aware of and will protect the defendants' First 
Amendment rights."91 The court's entire analysis under the 
"public interest" prong of the injunctive relief test consisted of a 
single sentence: "Finally, it is in the public's interest to protect 
the copyright laws and the interests of copyright holders."92 
85. See David Carney, Tech Law Journal, Summary of Intellectual Reserve v. Utah 
Lighthouse Ministries (LDS Copyright Case) (last modified Dec. 29, 1999) <http://www. 
techlawjournal.com/courts/lds/Default.htm>. 
86. See Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Welcome to the Official Website of Utah Lighthouse 
Ministry (visited July 12, 2000) <http://www.utlm.org>. 
87. See Utah Lighthouse, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1293. 
88. See id. at 1294. 
89. See id. at 1294-95. Any visit to the infringing material would constitute a direct 
infringement, the court held, because the material would be copied into the visitors' 
random access memory. See id. See also MAl Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 
991 F.2d 511,518 (9th Cir. 1993). In the case ofThirdVoice, supra text accompanying 
notes 15-26, the derivative work would be created (if at all) in the visitor's random 
access memory. ThirdVoice would simply facilitate that process. 
90. Id. at 1295. 
91. 75 F. ·supp. 2d at 1295. 
92. /d. 
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Although ULM had not yet raised the affirmative defense of 
fair use, another recent decision offers little encouragement. In 
Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic,93 the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California granted plaintiffs' 
motion for summary adjudication rejecting defendants' fair use 
defense. Plaintiffs included the Los Angeles Times and The 
Washington Post Company; defendant Free Republic is a politi-
cally conservative, web-based opinion forum on which registered 
visitors post news articles and comment on them.94 
With respect to the first fair use factor, the purpose and 
character of the use, the court found nothing transformative in the 
added comments of visitors to the site95 and gave little weight to 
defendants' argument that the site's primary purpose was "to 
facilitate the discussion, criticism and comment of the registered 
users" that follows the posting.96 Instead, the court concluded that 
the site was "commercial"-regardless of Free Republic's profit 
or nonprofit status or motives-because "[t]he fact that the 
articles are posted on the web page allows visitors to review 
archived material without paying the fee they would be charged 
ifthey visited plaintiffs' web sites."97 
The court conceded that the second fair use factor-the nature 
of the copyrighted work-cut in favor ofthe defendants when the 
works are news articles. 98 But it ruled that the third factor-the 
amount and substantiality of the use-favored the plaintiffs when 
entire articles were copied.99 The court declined to accept 
defendants' argument that full-text copying was essential to the 
purpose of the use, finding it merely conclusory . 10° Finally, the 
court found that "the availability of the papers' news articles in 
full text on the Free Republic site fulfills at least to some extent 
the demand for the original works and diminishes plaintiffs' 
ability to sell or license their articles. " 101 Thus, despite defen-
93. No. 98-7840 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 1999). 
94. See id., slip op. at 1. See also Benkler, supra note 78 at 357; Free Republic, 
L.L.C., www.FreeRepublic.com Conservative News Forum· (visited July 12, 2000) 
<http://www .freerepublic.com/>. 
95. See Free Republic, No. 98-7840, slip op. at 12. 
96. /d. at 16-19. 
97. /d. at 19. 
98. See id. at 21. 
99. See id. at 24. 
100. See id. 
101. Free Republic, No. 98-7840. slip op. at 26. 
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dants' claim of a positive impact on plaintiffs' web site "hits" and 
corresponding advertising revenue, the court found the fourth 
factor-potential market impact-favored the plaintiffs. 
In considering defendants' independent First Amendment 
argument, the court held that even a generous interpretation of 
defendants' rights would be defeated by the fact that users could 
post summarie·s of or links to the copyrighted articles. 102 "While 
defendants and users offreerepublic.com might find these options 
less ideal than being able to copy entire news articles verbatim, 
their speech is in no way restricted by denying them the ability to 
infringe on plaintiffs' exclusive rights in the copyrighted news 
articles. " 103 
Neither case deviates from traditional copyright analysis, and, 
while one might differ with one or more of either judge's 
conclusions, there is no apparent abuse of discretion. Yet both 
decisions have the effect of negating or sharply reducing the 
endorsement and annotation functions that will become vital to 
realizing the informing and educating potential of the new 
medium I predicted above. A heavier First Amendment weight on 
the scale would have tipped both decisions in favor of the public 
interest. 
V. MEDIA PROFESSIONALISM 
Reinterpreting copyright law to narrow the definition of 
derivative works, or broaden the scope of fair use, will not solve 
all the problems of consolidation and convergence. For example, 
it will not improve the quality of the underlying news product. 
The important but sensitive news story that has been spiked or 
sanitized because of the government's potential embarrassment or 
the publisher's financial interests cannot become the predicate for · 
further analysis and comment. 104 
102. See id. at 28 (citing MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT, l.l O[D] (1999), for the proposition that the First Amendment allows 
otherwise infringing copies where "copying of the expression is essential effectively 
to convey the idea expressed"). 
103. Free Republic, No. 98-7840, slip op. at 28. 
104. As this essay was being finalized for publication, the Boston Herald suspended 
a reporter who alleged that his editors censored his coverage of FleetBoston, which 
advertises regularly in the newspaper and holds the $20 million mortgage on the Herald 
Building. The paper called it an "internal disciplinary matter." David L. Greene, 
Suspension of Boston Reporter Raises the Specter of Censorship, BALTIMORE SUN, May 4, 
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It can, however, clear the way for annotations that affirm and 
reinforce good journalism, while fixing mistakes, filling gaps, and 
countering biases that find their way into the mainstream media. 
Relieved of the threat of legal action, 10' we can expect a rich mix 
of annotations from readers and subjects, from interested parties 
and disinterested experts, even from competitors and independent 
journalists. 
While we wait for this golden age· to materialize, for bold 
action from legislatures that have been cowed by the software and 
motion picture industries into exalting intellectual property rights 
above all other values, and from courts that increasingly view 
reporters as public enemy number one, we need to rethink our 
own roles in this new media environment and join together in 
collective action to preserve the integrity of our craft. 
We have already formed associations-such as the Society of 
Professional Journalists 106 and the American Society of Newspa-
per Editors 107-that aspire to safeguard our commitment to ethical 
journalism in the face of owners and publishers who would tear 
down the walls that separate editorial from advertising depart-
ments or erect new walls to protect the interests of corporate 
owners. We have also created unions or guilds that protect us 
from material retaliation for ethical assertiveness. But we can and 
must do more. 
We must begin to recreate our relationship with our employ-
ers for an era when journalists are often far removed from the 
owners of the media. That distance was not nearly so great when 
A.J. Liebling wrote that "[f]reedom of the press is guaranteed 
only to those who own one."108 While no one would deny a 
2000, at 3A. 
105. Alas, that may take some time. Even where courts have rejected intellectual 
property claims that impede free speech (and defY common sense), attorneys are still 
using the threat oflegal action to intimidate critics. Compare Lucent Technologies v. 
Lucentsucks.com, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6159 (E.D. Va. May 3, 2000) (dismissing 
Lucent's complaint under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U .S.C. 
§ 1125) with Letter from Sarah B. Deutsch, Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc., to 
Emmanuel Goldstein, 2600 Enterprises, May 5, 2000 (asserting that the domain name 
Goldstein registered-verizonreallysucks.com-infringes on Bell Atlantic trademarks 
and violates anti-cybersquatting legislation) 2600 Magazine, News Archives(visited July 
12, 2000) <http://www.2600.com/news/2000/0508.html>. 
106. See Society of Professional Journalists, Ethics in Journalism (visited July 12, 
2000) <http://www.spj.org/ethicsl>. 
107. See ASNE, supra note 4. 
108. A. J. LIEBLING, THE PRESS 32 (Pantheon Books 1981)(1975). 
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General Electric or Disney their constitutional freedom from 
government regulation with respect to their media interests, no 
one should imagine that these corporate entities are the reposito-
ries of all that we mean by a "free press." Journalists must find 
a way to assert the independence we need to fulfill our obligation 
to society. 
While we have long eschewed the concept of"professional," 
for a variety of valid reasons, not the least of which is another 
invitation to regulation, 109 we can perhaps find a journalistic 
analogy to the academic freedom that permeates the relationship 
between teacher-scholars and their institutions. 110 Both reporter 
and professor are, at once, employees who serve specific masters 
and free agents who serve the public interest in accord with a 
sacred set of principles. We must undertake collective action to 
protect that latter role in the new era. 
The tenure system that has served academics so well in this 
regard does not seem realistic for journalists. Publishers, and 
perhaps journalists as well, have even resisted the idea of a 
universal set of ethical standards as an infringement upon press 
freedom. 111 But where the alternative may be government 
regulation, and the public is at best indifferent, if not hostile, 
perhaps a new ethical manifesto is in order. Such a manifesto 
would outline the substantive responsibilities of employers of 
journalists with respect to editorial integrity. We cannot legally 
impose such a m~nifesto on our employers as long as they are 
First Amendment actors, but we can exert collective pressure to 
induce the major players to adopt it. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Technology, law and ethics all have a role to play in the new 
media world. Technology will provide the means by which we 
can correct some of the problems with homogenized journalism. 
Law-in time-will recognize the need to allow those technologi-
cal tools to flourish unencumbered by outdated notions of 
1 09. See Robert Drechsel, The Paradox of Professionalism: Journalism and Malpractice, 
23 U. ARK. Ll1TLE ROCK L. REv. I 81, I 90 (2000). 
II 0. See BAKER, supra note 66, at 253-55. 
I I I. See, e.g., Mark Fitzgerald, Ethics Codes Out of the Closet, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, 
Oct. 16, 1999, at 10. See also Bill Kirtz, Play it Again, Bill, EDITOR& PUBLISHER, Feb. 28, 
2000, at 17, I 9 (interview with Bill Kovach). 
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intellectual property rights. But in the end, the very bestjournal-
ism will depend upon an ethical understanding among reporters, 
editors, publishers, and corporate owners. The public has a right 
to the independence of journalists vis-a-vis the media empires that 
employ them. The journalist, not the corporate ·o:wner and 
certainly not the government, is the best guarantor of a free press 
going into the twenty-first century. 
